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ABSTRACT: Participants to a legal process often use linguistic arguments to support their claim. With a 
linguistic argument it is shown that the proposed interpretation of a rule is based on the meaning of the words 
used in the rule in ordinary or technical language. The reason why a linguistic argument is chosen as a support 
for a legal claim is that linguistic arguments are considered to have a preferred status in justifying a legal 
decision. However, this preferred status can also be ‘misused’ for rhetorical reasons. 
 In my contribution I analyse and evaluate an example of a form of strategic manoeuvring with a 
linguistic argument that often occurs in discussions about the application of legal rules and I explain how the 
strategic manoeuvring derails. I explain that the strategic manoeuvring with the linguistic argument 
constitutes a complex form of strategic manoeuvring that consists of a combination of two manoeuvres. 
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Participants to a legal process often use a linguistic argument to support their claim. With a 
linguistic argument it is shown that the proposed interpretation of a rule is based on the 
meaning of the words used in the rule in ordinary or technical language. The reason why a 
linguistic argument is chosen as a support for a legal claim is that linguistic arguments are 
considered to have a preferred status in justifying a legal decision.1 However, this preferred 
status can also be ‘misused’ for rhetorical reasons. An example of a strategic use of 
linguistic argumentation can be found in the discussion in Dutch law in a case called 
‘Homomarriage’ about the application of the old article 1.33 of the Dutch Civil Code, that 
says that a man can only marry a woman and a woman can only marry a man. In this case a 
civil servant refused to marry a female homosexual couple on the basis of this article. 
 the text of this article does not forbid a marriage between 
 
1 See MacCormick and Summers (1991, 530-532) who develop a model for the justification of the 
interpretation of legal rules. The first step in the strategy of interpretation is to consider linguistic arguments 
that must be accepted as prima facie unless there is some reason to consider systemic arguments that must, in 
their turn, be accepted as prima facie unless there is some reason to consider teleological/evaluative 
arguments. 
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two women because it only says that one man can only marry one woman with the stress on 
the formulation ‘a interpreted as ‘one and hence must be interpreted as a prohibition of 
polygamy. The judge of first instance, the judge in appeal and the Dutch Supreme Court 
(Hoge Raad 19 oktober 1990, RvdW 1990, 176) decide that the claim is based on a 
disputable literal reading of several articles and misunderstands the purpose of the law as 
intended by the legislator (the relevant part of the decision referred to here is added at the 
end of this contribution).2 
 In this example, a particular reading of the rule is presented as the accepted standard 
reading, although other interpretations of the rule are possible from a legal perspective. In 
addition, reference to the presupposed standard meaning of the rule is presented as a 
sufficient justification, although it is not possible to establish the meaning on the basis of 
the formulation of the rule alone, because also other considerations must be taken into 
account. In such a case, if a linguistic argument is used in a wrong way, the use of the 
linguistic argument is evaluated negatively. As we saw in the example, it is criticized firstly 
because it is based on ‘a disputable literal reading of statute law’ and secondly because it is 
based on ‘a misunderstanding of the law as the legislator had in mind when enacting it.’  
 Although higher judges often give a negative evaluation of certain uses of linguistic 
arguments, in the literature on legal interpretation and the justification of legal decisions, 
no clear norms for the use of linguistic arguments are specified. The aim of my contribution 
is to develop an instrument to analyse and evaluate the use of linguistic arguments in legal 
discussions about the application of a legal rule. I analyse the use of linguistic arguments in 
terms of the strategic manoeuvring in the context of a critical discussion. I establish when 
the strategic manoeuvring with linguistic arguments is acceptable from this perspective 
and when it derails. 
In the analysis of the strategic manoeuvring I make use of the insights developed by 
van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2006) about strategic manoeuvring in 
argumentative discourse. I consider strategic manoeuvring with linguistic arguments as an 
attempt to convince a legal audience by showing that a legal standpoint is in accordance 
with accepted legal starting points without violating openly the dialectical norms of 
reasonableness. The strategic manoeuvring implies that the arguer tries to reconcile two, 
often conflicting goals, the rhetorical reasonableness norm of convincing the audience and 
the dialectical reasonableness norm of resolving the difference of opinion in a critical 
discussion. The strategic manoeuvring derails when the rhetorical norm to convince 
prevails over the dialectical reasonableness norm. If the dialectical reasonableness norm is 
violated, in pragma-dialectical terms the party commits a fallacy. 
 To be able to assess the strategic manoeuvring with linguistic arguments first, in (2), 
I specify the dialectical norms for the use of linguistic argumentation in the context of a 





2 In this case the lower judges and the Supreme Court also put forward additional argumentation in which 
they react to other arguments put forward by the plaintiff in which they discuss the argument by the plaintiff 
that the views in society about same-sex relations have changed since the enactment of the law. The courts 
make clear that in certain matters, such as the present one that concerns the public sphere where legal 
certainty plays an important role, it is not the task of the judge to change the meaning of a rule by departing 
from the goal of the rule as intended by the legislator on the basis of changing views in society. The Supreme 
Court argues that it is not the task of the judge to decide against the clear meaning of the rule about marriage, 
since abolition of the prohibition to marry for same-sex couples would have far-reaching consequences. In 
new legislation in the Netherlands the possibility of a same-sex marriage is introduced. 
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argumentation forms an adequate means of justifying a legal decision about the application 
of a legal rule in a concrete case. Then, in (3), I analyse and evaluate a form of strategic 
manoeuvring with linguistic arguments that often occurs in discussions about the 
application of legal rules and I explain on the basis of the norms specified in (2) how the 
strategic manoeuvring derails. I explain that the strategic manoeuvring with linguistic 
arguments in these cases consists of a complex form of strategic manoeuvring that 
constitutes a combination of two manoeuvres. 
 
2. NORMS FOR THE USE OF LINGUISTIC ARGUMENTATION IN CRITICAL 
LEGAL DISCUSSION 
 
If we look at the discussion about the use of linguistic arguments in the justification of legal 
decisions we find, generally speaking, a consensus about the functional use of linguistic 
arguments. In clear cases in which there is no difference of opinion about the interpretation 
of a legal rule, linguistic argumentation can function as a justification of the decision, 
although a justification is not necessary in such cases because there is no difference of 
opinion.3 In hard cases in which there is a difference of opinion about the correct 
interpretation of the rule, a linguistic argument cannot function as a decisive argument 
because there are different views with respect to the exact meaning of the rule.4 
The reason why a linguistic argument may suffice as a justification in an easy case 
is that, from the perspective of legal certainty, in principle reference to the clear intention 
of the legislator as it appears from the wordings of the law, must be taken as the starting 
point for the application of the law. In hard cases in which there is a difference of opinion 
about the meaning of the law for the concrete case because the intention of the legislator 
cannot be deduced from the wordings, other sources are necessary to establish the intention 
of the legislator. Linguistic arguments can have a ‘demarcating’ function by showing that 
the judge has remained within the interpretation space he has on the basis of the 
formulation of the rule.5 
The problem with the strategic use of linguistic arguments is that parties to a legal 
process often present a case as an easy case in which a linguistic argument suffices to 
justify the decision because a linguistic argument is supposed to have a ‘presumptive’ 
status from the perspective of legal certainty. However, if the case is a hard case such a 
presentation is misleading because, as we have seen in the case of the ‘Homomarriage,’ 
other arguments based on the legal system, the intention of the legislator, the goal of the 
rule, etcetera are required to give an adequate justification. If these arguments are not given 
the justification is not sufficient and the party evades the burden of proof by not mentioning 




 Given the different functions of linguistic arguments in different legal discussion 
contexts, the question arises which uses of linguistic arguments can be distinguished and 
which norms apply for an acceptable use of linguistic arguments in the context of these 
clear and hard cases from the perspective of a rational critical legal discussion. 
 
3 Cf. Groenewegen (2007), Soeteman (2007) and van den Hoven (2007). 
4 Cf. Groenewegen (2007), Soeteman (2007), van den Hoven (2007). 
3
5 Judges often refer to linguistic arguments when they balance the requirements of legal certainty and the 
requirements of justice and fairness in the concrete case. See also Feteris (2005 and 2008a) on the balancing 
of legal certainty and fairness. 
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From an argumentative perspective we can distinguish between two forms of using 
linguistic arguments, based on the relation between the linguistic argument and the 
standpoint. In what I call the first form, a linguistic argument is presented as an 
independent justification. In the second form, a linguistic argument is supplemented with 
other arguments. To establish the norms for an acceptable use of linguistic arguments in 
these two forms, from a pragma-dialectical perspective a distinction can be made between 
two types of norms. The first type of norm concerns the adequacy of linguistic 
argumentation as a means to justify a legal decision: whether linguistic argumentation can, 
in a particular discussion context, constitute an adequate and sufficient justification. The 
second type of norm concerns the correctness of the application in the concrete case: 
whether the linguistic interpretation of the rule in the concrete case is correct. 
For each form I specify under which conditions the linguistic argument is an 
adequate justification (condition a) and is used in an acceptable way (condition b). 
 
(1)  A linguistic argument is presented as an independent justification of the 
application of a legal rule 
 
From a legal perspective, if there is no difference of opinion about the interpretation of the 
rule and if the formulation of the rule can give a clear and uncontested indication for 
establishing the meaning of the rule in the concrete case, single argumentation consisting 
of a linguistic argument can constitute an independently sufficient justification. In such a 
case it is not necessary to mention that other arguments, such as a systematic arguments or 
teleological arguments, do not point to a different solution.6 
When a linguistic argument is presented as an independent justification it is 
acceptable if: 
 
(1a)  the argumentation is put forward in a context of an easy case in which there is 
no difference of opinion with respect to the interpretation of the rule in 
relation to the facts of the concrete case 
(1b)  the linguistic argumentation refers to the accepted standard meaning of (a term 
used in) the rule 
 
Norm (1a) concerns the adequacy of linguistic argumentation as an independently 
sufficient argumentation in a legal context and (1b) concerns the acceptability of the 
propositional content of the argumentation. 
This form of using linguistic argumentation does not occur very often in legal 
practice because judges do not tend to justify their interpretation if it concerns a clear and 
uncontested case. If it is used, judges tend to do this for strategic reasons to anticipate 
possible doubt with respect to the acceptability of the decision and use linguistic 
argumentation for rhetorical reasons to convince the audience that the decision is coherent 
with common legal starting points, i.e. the linguistic meaning of (a particular expression in) 





6 In pragma-dialectical terms such an independent argument constitutes single argumentation or, if part of a 
complex argumentation consisting of more independent arguments, multiple argumentation. In terms of 
MacCormick and Summers (1991, 525-530) an independent argument can be a single argument or part of 
coinciding argumentation. 
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referring to the ‘common understanding of the term’ or reference to the description in the 
dictionary. 
Sometimes, for rhetorical reasons, the linguistic argumentation is supplemented 
with coordinative arguments such as systematic or teleological arguments to show that the 
decision is also in line with other rules of the relevant part of the legal system and/or the 
intention of the legislator. 
 
(2) A linguistic argument is presented as a supplementary argument in addition to 
other argumentation 
 
In cases where there is a difference of opinion about the correct meaning of the rule and the 
formulation of the rule does not give a clear and uncontested indication for establishing the 
meaning of the rule in relation to the concrete case, linguistic argumentation cannot 
constitute a sufficient justification and must be supplemented by other forms of 
argumentation. In such cases systematic argumentation or teleological argumentation must 
form a necessary part of the argumentation, while linguistic argumentation can only 
function as a supplementary co-ordinative or subordinate argument.7 
 When a linguistic argument is presented as a supplementary argument it is only 
acceptable if: 
 
(2a)  the linguistic argument constitutes a support for the same interpretation of the 
(term used in) the rule as the other arguments that are put forward as a 
justification 







We find this form of using linguistic argumentation in cases where the legal rule contains a 
vague or evaluative term so that the rule must be interpreted to establish the meaning of the 
rule for the concrete case. In such a case linguistic argumentation can never constitute an 
independent justification because it is not possible to establish in abstracto what the 
meaning is by checking the literal meaning or the technical meaning of the term. The 
meaning will have to be established by looking at the legal system and/or goal of the rule. 
Systematic or teleological argumentation then forms a necessary part of the argumentation 
and the linguistic argumentation can only have the function as supplementary coordinative 
argumentation. Linguistic argumentation of this form is often presented in the form of a 
statement that also the formulation of the rule supports this interpretation or that the 
formulation of the rule does not form an objection to application in the proposed 
 
7 In pragma-dialectical terms such a supplementary argument constitutes a part of coordinative compound 
argumentation. In terms of MacCormick and Summers (1991, 525-530) such an argument forms part of 
cumulative argumentation. 
8 For example: if a judge argues for an a contrario application of a rule, he will put forward a linguistic 
argument if the formulation of the rule contains a verbal indicator that gives an uncontested indication that the 
rule is meant as a limitative enumeration of the conditions for applying the rule. 
9 It may also occur in cases in which there is no discussion about the interpretation of a vague or evaluative 
term but there is still a difference of opinion about the exact interpretation that must be given of a rule on the 
basis of the question whether in the context of a specific case (and similar cases) a particular formulation used 
5
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Since linguistic arguments have a ‘preferred’ status judges tend to use this form of 
argumentation as supplementary argumentation for rhetorical reasons to increase the 
acceptability of their decision for the legal audience. The linguistic argument must increase 
the acceptability by showing that also on other grounds it can be asserted that the decision 
is coherent with common starting points. 
 
3. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING WITH 
LINGUISTIC ARGUMENTS 
 
On the basis of the distinction between the two forms of using linguistic arguments in the 
different discussion contexts and the norms for an acceptable use, in this section I discuss 
the example given at the beginning of this contribution in the case of the ‘Homomarriage’ 
from Dutch civil law. In this case the Supreme Court, in pragma-dialectical terms, gave a 
ruling in which it gave a negative evaluation of the strategic manoeuvring of one of the 
parties with linguistic argumentation. I specify how the example can be analysed in terms 
of the first and second form of using linguistic argumentation and I explain how the norms 
specified in section (2) can be used to determine when the strategic manoeuvring with 
linguistic argumentation is acceptable and when it derails. I do this by explaining how the 
evaluation of the Supreme Court can be translated in terms of derailing strategic 
manoeuvring. 
Parties in a legal dispute often present a linguistic argument as an independently 
sufficient justification. As we have seen, in easy cases if the conditions for the first form 
are met, it is a perfectly sound way of justifying a legal decision. However, the strategic 
manoeuvring with linguistic argumentation may derail because one or more of the 
conditions for an acceptable use of a specific form of using linguistic argumentation is not 
met. Sometimes parties in a legal dispute present a particular interpretation of the rule as 
the accepted standard interpretation of the rule although this is not the case and condition 
(1b) of the first form is not met. In such a case the strategic manoeuvring derails because in 
doing so the party violates the starting point rule because a particular meaning of the rule is 
wrongly presented as a common starting point in the legal community. 
Starting with presenting of a particular interpretation as the accepted standard 
interpretation a party may claim that the linguistic argumentation based on the formulation 
of the rule may serve as an independent justification. As we have seen, in cases in which 
the conditions of the first form are met, this is a perfectly sound way of justifying a legal 
standpoint. However, if the interpretation of the formulation of the rule is not the accepted 
standard interpretation, the linguistic argumentation can never function as an independent 
justification and other arguments are required to justify the application of the rule. In such 
cases a linguistic argument cannot constitute an independently sufficient argument. For 
this reason, if a party or a judge presents the formulation of the rule as an independent 
justification in a case that does not meet condition (1a) for the first form, the strategic 
manoeuvring derails. In such a case the ‘preferred’ status of linguistic argumentation is 
misused by presenting the argumentation as an adequate justification although it does not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the rule must be given a particular meaning or not. In such cases the same applies as in the case of a vague 
f evaluative term: the meaning must be established on the basis of systematic or teleological argumentation 
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meet condition (1a) of the first form but must be reconstructed as argumentation of the 
second form which would have been the correct form. By doing so, someone evades the 
burden of proof for the necessary supplementing coordinative argumentation referring to 
the legal system and/or goal of the rule (that form a necessary supplement of the linguistic 
argumentation of the second form) and the strategic manoeuvring constitutes a violation of 
the burden of proof rule. 
In the example of the case of the ‘Homomarriage’ we find this complex form of 
strategic manoeuvring that consists of a combination of these two forms of strategic 
manoeuvring that both derail because two discussion rules are violated. Firstly, it 
constitutes an instantiation of derailing strategic manoeuvring because condition (1b) is not 
fulfilled. The proposed literal reading of  ‘a man’ and ‘a woman’ in clause 1.33 is wrongly 
presented as the only possible reading because there is also another reading, i.e. the 
accepted standard reading. The Supreme Court states that the other reading implies that the 
article must be read in the standard reading as forbidding a same-sex marriage so that the 
given interpretation is incorrect. 
Furthermore it constitutes an instantiation of derailing strategic manoeuvring 
because condition (1a) is not fulfilled. The linguistic argument can never be the only 
argument because, according to the Supreme Court, in establishing the meaning of a rule 
also the legislative history of the rule and the goal of the rule as intended by the legislator 
must be taken into account, so the argument could never serve as an independent 
justification. With the formulation ‘miskent de strekking van de wet’ (ignores the purpose 
of the rule) the Supreme Court indicates that the purpose of the rule as it is based on the 
legislative history is a necessary element of a justification of the interpretation of the 
meaning of a rule. 
In the example the combination of the violation of the starting point rule and the 
violation of the burden of proof rule can be considered as a specific form of derailing 
strategic manoeuvring. The derailment consists of a combination of two violations. The 
first violation implies that a particular interpretation of the meaning of the rule is wrongly 
presented as the only correct interpretation. Starting from this incorrect interpretation the 
second violation implies that certain information (the goal of the rule as intended by the 
legislator) is wrongly ignored and is not included in the argumentation so that the burden of 
proof for this information is evaded. In the evaluation of the Supreme Court we see that 
both mistakes are assessed individually as mistakes in the context of a rational discussion 
about the application of legal rules. The violation of the starting point rule is characterized 
as departing from a ‘disputable literal reading of statute law’ (gaat uit van een aanvechtbare 
letterlijke lezing). The violation of the burden of proof rule is characterized as a 
‘misunderstanding of the law as the legislator had in mind when enacting it’ (miskent de 
strekking van de wet zoals men die bij haar totstandkoming voor ogen heeft gehad). The 
combination of the two forms of strategic manoeuvring can be considered as a complex 
form of strategic manoeuvring in which the second builds on the first form so that the 






In my contribution I have made a first attempt to reconstruct the strategic manoeuvring 
with linguistic arguments in a discussion about the application of a legal rule in a concrete 
7
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case in the context of a court of law. I have explained how the legal norms can be translated 
in pragma-dialectical terms to explain why certain forms of strategic manoeuvring with 
linguistic arguments in this activity type are acceptable and when the strategic 
manoeuvring derails. 
By distinguishing two forms of the use of linguistic argumentation I have tried to 
give a systematic and precise description of the ways in which linguistic argumentation can 
be used and on the basis of the translation of the norms I have shown how it can be 
explained why certain forms of strategic manoeuvring with a particular use are acceptable 
and other forms derail. 
In the analysis of an example from Dutch law I have demonstrated how the 
framework for evaluating the soundness of strategic manoeuvring can be used in 
explaining why certain ways of using linguistic argumentation in a particular context are 
unacceptable and constitute a derailment of strategic manoeuvring. I have explained that 
the strategic manoeuvring with linguistic argumentation often takes the form of a complex 
of strategic manoeuvres that are mutually dependent and each form a violation of a 
discussion rule. 
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